“We cannot study the individual separate from the environment, or the environment separate from the individual. All crime prevention currently being carried out limits the problem of crime prevention to the physical environment.”

C. Ray Jeffery; Sept. 1999

“CPTED? Yeah, it’s all good stuff, but it’s all about housing estates isn’t it.”

- A British Transport Police Architectural Liaison Officer

Crime in Context – the Transport Network in London

- London Underground facilitating 4 million passenger journeys per day
- Only c. 30,000 recorded crimes per year (in all categories)
- Currently running at less than 1 robbery per day
- Criminal Damage falling despite better reporting
- Despite this, fear of crime still a challenge
- London Buses providing 6.5 million passenger journeys per day
- Only c.14 crimes per million passenger journeys
- This is all categories, including Criminal Damage
- Initial spike in stats following introduction of free travel for schoolchildren now returned to below 2006 levels
- Criminal damage being specifically targeted through Operation BusTag

THE TEN PRINCIPLES OF CRIME REDUCTION
- Target hardening
- Target removal
- Remove the means to commit crime
- Reduce the payoff
- Access control
- Surveillance/Visibility
- Environmental design
- Rule setting
- Increase the risk of being caught
- Deflect offenders

TARGET HARDENING
- Selected materials
- Amendments to engineering Standards
- Glass treatments and specifications
- Also adopting “low tech” fixes for high tech problems

TARGET REMOVAL

REMOVE THE MEANS TO COMMIT CRIME
SURVEILLANCE/VISIBILITY

Natural Visibility

SURVEILLANCE/VISIBILITY

Formal Surveillance
- CCTV
- Police
- Security Guards
- Wardens...

SURVEILLANCE/VISIBILITY

Informal Surveillance

TOTAL POLICING

TOTAL POLICING
ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN

RULE SETTING

INCREASE THE RISK OF BEING CAUGHT

DEFLECT OFFENDERS
THE APPLICATION OF CPTED PRINCIPLES TO PUBLIC TRANSPORT LOCATIONS

Permeability/Anonymity

Permeability space

Necessary to think beyond the physical environment when considering anonymity – 2nd Gen CPTED:

- Registration of Season Tickets (Oyster cards)
- Now challenged by “Wave & Pay” – personal data owned by banks
- Customers using well-regulated areas
Secondary Revenue: Customer Amenity or Crime Generator?

- Often impossible to separate the two effects
- Cannot ignore the strong business case for secondary revenue generators
- Therefore necessary to “design-in” mitigating factors to reduce risk
- Crime may not be the only imperative

Section 17 Crime and Disorder Act 1998 says:

- "Without prejudice to any other obligation imposed upon it, it shall be the duty of each authority... to exercise its various functions with due regard to the likely effect of the exercise of those functions on, and the need to do all that it reasonably can to prevent crime and disorder in this area."

Police and Justice Act 2006 included anti-social behaviour, drug and substance misuse in the definition

Transport Locations – Defensible Space, or just areas for Surveillance?

- Are TfL staff capable guardians?
- Possible to create “sense” of ownership by TfL – a “managed environment” applying CPTED tools
- Territorial reinforcement and rule setting (“The Byelaws”)
- Symbolic barriers/delineation
- Perimeters
- Surveillance (Natural, Staff and CCTV)
- Design & Layout (customer usage, clear lines of sight)
- Cleanliness (Litter clearance, graffiti removal)
- Lighting/Decor
- Legibility (clear signage, the Tube map!)
AWARENESS – THE USE OF “COGNITIVE SPACE”

- Personal awareness is a key tool in the psychology of CPTED
- TF utilising zones which raise this awareness
- Often double as symbolic barriers
- Often assist in general safety – for instance on platforms
WHY ARE HUBS SO CRITICAL?

- What is a “Hub”? The TfL Context:
  - 4 million passenger journeys per weekday – LU
  - 6.5 passenger journeys per weekday – London Buses
  - Crucial inter-modal interchanges facilitating complex journeys around the city
  - Essential for London commerce and TfL future planning

PERSONAL SECURITY AT HUBS

- The “crime context”
  - Many inner-city hubs often form a part of local streetcrime “hotspots”
  - Why? Rational Choice Theory
    - Choice/vulnerability of victims
    - Risk of apprehension/arrest
    - Likely reward
    - Multitude of factors influencing decision

THE TFL APPROACH

- Based firmly in a partnership approach
- No single agency holds all the tools to reduce or prevent crime & ASB
- Essential that a systematic, collaborative approach is adopted and sustained
- Embodied in “Hub Action Plans”
HUB ACTION PLANS
- Audit crime & disorder in clearly defined “footprint” area
- Carry out Environmental Visual Audit
- Identify hub users and residents & consult on priorities
- Qualified specialists in crime reduction identify interventions and key players
- Engage and implement interventions

HUB ACTION PLANS (CONT’D.)
- Monitor implementation of interventions on regular basis
- Report to key players on progress
- Evaluate after agreed period (12 months min.)
- Feedback, review and refresh
- Refresh plan and continue

THE RESULTS
- HAP’s contributors to 9 successive years of transport-related crime reductions
- Crime rate on transport in London down to 6 crimes per million passenger journeys in April 2015 (8.6 in April 2013)
- Specific hubs in challenging areas showing good performance on identified priorities

THE SITUATION - OLYMPICS
CPTED & Vigilance

WHAT “DROVE” TFL’S NEED FOR INCREASED VIGILANCE FROM ITS STAFF?
- Mayoral Priority – “Getting it right for London”
- “London 2012 is the World’s first public transport Olympics…” Shaun McCarthy – Chairman, Independent Commission for a Sustainable London 2012
- Crime is bad for business
- Legal obligation
- Crime prevention saves money

THE DEMAND CHALLENGE
- Predictions of huge increases in already stretched travel demand
- LU traffic up 30%
- LDRCL traffic up 47%
- We knew that DLR carried 500,000 passengers on 30/7/12 – 65% increase from normal levels
THE PREPARATIONS FOR TERRORISM
- Range of strategic level groups active on run-up to games
- Applying complex Crime Risk Assessment Matrices (CRAM's)
- MPS Olympic Security Directorate
- ODA
- TfL Operational Security
- British Transport Police

THE FLAWS IN THE PROCESS
- Already "embedded" security processes against "traditional" threat
- Airports style security not practical in Tube environment
- Even if they were, would only prompt early detonation
- Those responsible for checks merely additional victims
- Best chance – identify Hostile Reconnaissance

WHAT’S OUT THERE?
- Behavioural Assessment Screening System
  - Delivers awareness techniques
  - Geared towards "Capable Guardians"
  - Usually "owned" by police and Border Agency

WHAT IS “I STARED”??
- A system which enables a member of any public-facing staff group to become proficient in identifying illegal or otherwise "nefarious" intent, thus increasing vigilance capacity
- A means by which such staff can challenge their own or their colleagues' expectations to ensure completely reasoned and justifiable responses and interventions
- An accredited system of training in relevant, proven crime prevention principles to facilitate the above in a way that maximises the likelihood of success, particularly in busy, complex environments (such as London’s public transport system)

HOW IS “I STARED” DIFFERENT?
- Academically accredited – unlike all other courses found
- Delivers all the usual baseline behaviour recognition tools PLUS applicable basic crime prevention theory
- Enables recipients to recognise situational factors in their location that are likely to influence the decisions made by those with criminal intent
- Tailored to include site-specific “what to do next” advice

HOW WAS THE TRAINING DELIVERED?
- TfL invested in a 2 year “Training for Trainers” licence, delivered via 9 TfL crime prevention staff reaching the accreditation criteria
- Over 3400 staff trained in run-up to Olympics – Olympic Travel Ambassadors and enrolment staff
- Legacy continuing with operational staff training continuing for duration of the licence – which has been extended for a further 2 years
TERRORISM: WHO IS A RISK?

There is no useful profile to assist law enforcement or intelligence to predict who will follow this trajectory of radicalization. Rather, the individuals who take this course begin as “unremarkable” from various walks of life.

(Sibler and Bhatt, 2007)

SOME THEMES

- Rational Choice
- Think offender
- NVC’s
- Baseline behaviour

I. S.T.A.R.E.D.® TRAINING FOR TFL TRAINERS – COURSE CONTENT

Day One:
- Introduction to and rationale for I.S.T.A.R.E.D.
- What do we know about terrorism?
- How crime prevention works – Rational Choice Theory
- The 10 basic principles of crime prevention
- Think offender/terrorist
- Environmental cues/Broken Windows theory
- Situational advice
- Traditional threats – E.V.I.L.D.O.N.E /new threats (mass human casualties)
- CCTV – sighting and capabilities
Day Two:
- Why am I suspicious? – The effects of non-verbal communications
- Establishing baselines of behaviour in a selected location
- Case-building techniques – who, where, what, why, when, how
- What do I do next? - Essential reporting components
- Case studies/visual review

Non-Verbal Communication

- Words are not the only means of communication
- Research shows that most communication is non-verbal – “Body language”
- Includes facial expression, gestures, eye contact, posture and even tone of voice
- Facial expressions found to be universal – yet only 50 out of 20,000 found to be able to recognise deception without formal training (Paul Ekman, 1972)
- Wordless signals can assist with assessing veracity through questions asked, and can influence resultant actions

Questioning Technique – 5 “W’s” and an “H”

- Who?
- When?
- What?
- Why?
- Where?
- How?

What do I do next? - Establishing reporting processes

- For I.S.T.A.R.E.D© to be fully effective it is essential that, having identified a risk, the staff involved know exactly what to do next
- Therefore necessary for trainers to make a full evaluation of the reporting mechanisms available to trainees in their workplace
- Always best to avoid the creation of additional tiers of reporting process - “K.I.S.S.” – consider laminated wallet card “aides memoires” etc. for reporting process
- Consult with managers, then match process to emergency/ intelligence service lines of communication
ESTABLISHING BASELINES OF BEHAVIOUR

Victoria

THE RESULTS?
- Success measurable only through overall crime levels during games
- 6% reduction in overall crime levels
- Zero terrorist alerts during the games
- Anecdotal evidence from staff of direct application of the training on the ground
- Also reported greater confidence in liaising with police as a result of the training

71-1

ESTABLISHING BASELINES OF BEHAVIOUR

Victoria

TO SUMMARISE ...
- There are many pathways to extremism
- Similarly, there is no single profile on an individual who may be more susceptible to radicalisation.
- Perpetrators have been found to differ in many respects – including their background both religious and social, education levels, socialisation and life experiences.
- No single trigger, situation or profile fits all.

71-2

ESTABLISHING BASELINES OF BEHAVIOUR

Victoria

MAXIMISING IMPACTS
- TfL funding training for Roads & Transport Policing Command PCSO's, PC's and Sergeants in Basic Crime Prevention & Problem Solving
- 1000 trained in accredited course by Feb 2015
- Harnessing “eyes and ears” of TfL staff – Accredited “I STARED” behavioural assessment training – where to look and what to look for

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THANKS FOR LISTENING.

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