Introduction

• Why did I write the book?

• What research underpins it?

• What is in the book?

• Selected elements from the book

Why did I write the book?

My thinking has developed and refined over time in the areas of CPTED research, policy and practice

Why did I write the book?

• 1997 UG essay against Defensible Space
• 1997-2000 PhD on DS was initially highly critical, research and findings challenged my thinking
• CPTED training 2000 – ‘think again’ (Draper / Crowe)
• Research fellowship – crime and the railways 2000 – 2004
• Working as a policy officer in the Department of Premier and Cabinet influenced my thinking (2004-2006)

Why did I write the book?

• The 10th ECCA Conference and evidence on crime patterns (2010) – challenged thinking again
• Curtin University - assumptions of planners, architects and urban designers often dismissed CPTED as just ‘promoting surveillance and eyes on the street’
• CPTED often seen and used as an OUTCOME – where guidelines show you how to do it all in a ‘COOKIE-CUTTER’ approach – without looking at local context or local risks.
Why did I write the book?

• The book is an attempt to provide theories, evidence, tools, audits and frameworks to help in the THINKING needed in the CPTED PROCESS.

What research underpins the book?

• Re-read seminal texts, including;
  - Jacobs’ *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (1961)
  - Jeffery’s *Crime Prevention through Environmental Design* (1971)
  - Newman’s *Defensible Space* (1972)

• A review of the criminological theories about place and urban space – particularly opportunity theories.

What research underpins the book?

• Reviewed the criminological evidence related to permeability, mixed-use development and high densities (e.g. grid versus cul-de-sac and pedestrian access ways).

• Examined evidence on crime and fear of crime at different environmental settings (e.g. generators, attractors, detractors).

• Examined developments in the domains of public health and sustainability.

What is in the book?

An introductory chapter plus 12 further chapters

2. CPTED basics and information and data requirements
3. Measuring crime and fear of crime
4. Environmental criminology – where + when of crime and opportunity theories
5. Fear of crime (info and mapping)
6. CPTED and people – the social dimension
7. Crime risk assessment – data, tools and audits
8. Surveillance – lighting and CCTV
9. International CPTED policies
10. Public health and sustainability (EIA, SIA, HIA)
11. Product design and crime
12. Assumptions about CPTED
13. The future

Misleading Media Reports and Crime!

*Recorded crime - 90% property crime 10% violent crime*

*Media report – 90% violent crime – 10% property crime*

What does the book try to do?

Provide theories and evidence to help CPTED practitioners to THINK about crime problems BEFORE developing potential solutions.

Provide frameworks, tools and audits to help CPTED practitioners to THINK about crime problems and potential solutions.

What evidence?


What evidence?


Selected elements from the book

CPTED as a process – not an outcome

Environmental criminology

2nd Generation CPTED – a Model

CPTED Assumptions

‘Cradle to the Grave’

The Future

Environmental Criminology

“is the study of crime, criminality, and victimisation as they relate first, to particular places, and secondly, to the way that individuals and organisations shape their activities by placed-based or spatial factors” (Bottoms and Wiles, 1997, p305)
Environmental Criminology

“most planning proceeds with little knowledge of crime patterns, crime attractors, crime generators, the importance of edges, paths and nodes or the site specific solutions that facilitate or even encourage crime” (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1998, p53).

Opportunity theories

**Crime Pattern Theory**
(Brantingham & Brantingham, 1981)

**Routine Activities Theory**
(Cohen & Felson, 1979)

**Rational Choice Theory**
(Cornish & Clarke, 1986)

**Situational Crime Prevention Theory**
(Clarke, 1980)

**Broken Windows Theory**
(Wilson & Kelling, 1982)

Crime Pattern Theory

Brantingham and Brantingham (1981) highlight how specific crimes occur in specific locations and at specific times.

Crime Pattern theory examines differing scales, from patterns of crime at the meso level (city) to the macro level (neighbourhood) to the micro level (building envelope). It focuses on the offender and target as they converge in space and time with a particular emphasis on the place of the criminal event.

Activity nodes, paths and edges are also important in the patterning of different types of crimes.

Rational Choice Theory (Cornish and Clarke, 1986)

…..asserts that most opportunistic offenders are rational in their decision-making and recognize, evaluate and respond to environmental cues.

These relate to the perceived risk, reward and effort associated with the offence and environmental factors within the built / natural environment are an integral part of the decision-making process.
### Situational Crime Prevention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Increase the effort</th>
<th>Increase the risk</th>
<th>Reduce the rewards</th>
<th>Reduce provocations</th>
<th>Remove excuses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Harden</td>
<td>Extend guardianship</td>
<td>Conceal target</td>
<td>Reduce frustration and stress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control access to facilities</td>
<td>Assist natural surveillance</td>
<td>Remove targets</td>
<td>Avoid disputes</td>
<td>Post instructions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Screen exits</td>
<td>Reduce anonymity</td>
<td>Identify property</td>
<td>Reduce emotional arousal</td>
<td>Alert conscience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deflect offenders</td>
<td>Utilise place managers</td>
<td>Disrupt markets</td>
<td>Neutralise peer pressure</td>
<td>Assist compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control tools / weapons</td>
<td>Strengthen formal surveillance</td>
<td>Deny benefits</td>
<td>Discourage imitation</td>
<td>Control drugs and alcohol</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clarke (1992, 1997)

### Broken Windows Theory (Wilson and Kelling, 1982)
- Identified the **appearance and maintenance** of the built environment as an indicator of social cohesion and informal social control.
- Poorly-maintained spaces (**broken windows**) indicate **no-one cares**, and encourage offending and can act as **crime magnets**.
- The **rapid repair of vandalism** and the maintenance of urban spaces can discourage further opportunities and prevent these problems from escalating.

(see also Newman, 1972; Perglut, 1982)

### Land-Use and Crime - Mind DEGAP!

- **Detractors** (**push away citizens**)
- **Enablers** (**no regulation**)
- **Generators** (**produce crime**)
- **Attractors** (**others attracted**)
- **Precipitators** (**provoke crime**)

(From Brantingham and Brantingham, 1995; Felson and Clarke, 1998)

### 2nd Generation CPTED

Defensible space initially criticised for **ignoring socio-economic factors**
- Merry – **undefended space** (1981)
- Atlas – **offensible space** (1991)

From this critique emerged the notion of **2nd Generation CPTED**

### 2nd Generation

2nd Generation CPTED emphasises four key concepts (Saville & Cleveland, 1997);
- Social cohesion
- Community connectivity
- Community culture
- Threshold capacity.

Also about inclusion and identity.
2nd Generation

Saville and Cleveland (1997, p1) observed;

‘What is significant about Jacobs’ ‘eyes on the street’ are not the sightlines or even the streets, but the eyes’.

Social factors affect the quality of ‘eyes on the street’

2nd Generation CPTED

In his review of 25 years of the use of defensible space in CPTED, Newman identified four practical social factors that clearly resonate with 2nd Generation CPTED (Newman, 1996)

• Resident participation
• Good quality local schools
• Effective links with local organisations.
• Design appropriate places for people to play recreate or simply sit.

2nd Generation CPTED

Other strategies for improving the effectiveness of 2nd Generation CPTED by considering social factors. These include:

• Human-scale development
• Local meeting places
• Youth work and youth centres
• SafeGrowth planning

An Integrated Dynamic Model for CPTED

CPTED Assumptions

Jacobs’ Warning

In The Death and Life of Great American Cities (1961, p26) Jacobs stated;

‘I hope no reader will try to transfer my observations into guides as to what goes on in towns, or little cities, or in suburbs which are still suburban’.
CPTED Assumptions

**Eyes on the Street**

**THE BYSTANDER EFFECT**

More people = less likelihood of intervention

See - http://youtu.be/OSsPfbup0ac

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**CPTED Assumptions Permeability**

- Permeable streets
- Reduced levels of crime
- More people on the streets
- Safer streets

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**CPTED Assumptions Mixed-use development**

- Mixed-use development
- Reduced levels of crime
- More people on the streets
- Safer streets

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**CPTED and Permeability Theory and Evidence**

This recent assumption in CPTED is encouraged by planning’s enthusiasm in the direction of New Urbanism and Transit Oriented Development.

Their advocacy of the grid street layout does not consider Crowe’s comments in Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (2000, p. 219), ‘residential development after World War II replaced grid-pattern streets with the curvilinear street, which has improved safety, security, neighbourhood identity, and property value’.

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**CPTED and Permeability Theory and Evidence**

The idea that permeable built environment layouts must reduce crime is contradicted by the criminological evidence.

40 studies show permeability can be associated with increased crime (see Cozens, 2011; 2014).

As Paulsen (2013, p21) has pointed out ‘the overprovision of permeability ...without use – is a security hazard’.

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**Crime, the Grid and the Cul-de-sac?**

Fashion cycles!
### CPTED and Mixed-use development Theory and Evidence

The idea that mixed-use developments must reduce crime is contradicted by the criminological evidence. 30 or so studies show mixed-use can be associated with increased crime (see Cozens, 2011; 2014).

The ‘increase in opportunities interacts with the lower informal social control to produce more crime’ (Paulsen, 2013, p24).

More important is type of ‘mix’? (NTE?)

### CPTED Assumptions High densities

- **High densities**
  - More people on the streets
  - Reduced levels of crime
  - Safer streets

- **Increased ‘eyes on the streets’**

### CPTED Assumptions

#### Theory and Evidence

The idea that high densities must reduce crime is contradicted by the criminological evidence. Numerous studies show mixed-use can be associated with increased crime (see Cozens, 2011; 2014).

In *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design*, Crowe stated (2000, p. 57) ‘high densities are to be avoided because the problems of crowding are self-evident’.

What types / rates of ‘density’ – human scale?

### Using Evidence, Theory and CPTED

“*The conventional view serves to protect us from the painful job of thinking*”

(J.K. Galbraith)

Jacobs (1961, p50) identified the city as; “a complex order” which implies she would support the continued critical analysis of the topic of crime and the built environment through use of better criminological evidence and careful thinking.

### Crime and Place

#### Theory and Evidence

In *Crime and Everyday Life*, Felson and Boba (2010) observe how daily life is divided into different types of settings, which can generate significant levels of crime. Settings with significant crime risks are:

- Public routes (especially footpaths, parking facilities and unsupervised transit areas)
- Recreational settings (especially bars and some parks)
- Public transport (especially stations and their vicinities)
- Retail stores (especially for shoplifting)
- Educational settings (especially at their edges)
- Offices (especially when entered for theft)
- Human support services (especially hospitals with 24-hour activities)
- Industrial locations (especially warehouses with ‘attractive’ goods).

Within each type of setting, a small number of locations (typically 20%) are commonly found to be accountable for the majority of the crime (80%)

Most locations exhibit relatively low levels of crime (80% account for 20% of the crime).

(Clarke and Eck 2007).
In Western Australia, **DEVELOPMENT** refers to the demolition, erection, construction, alteration of, or addition to, any building or structure and any excavation or other works carried out on the land (Part 1, Section 4, Planning and Development Act, 2005).

Developments **change** – and so do crime risks.
One of the eight elements to a healthy city is “secure neighbourhoods where localities offer security and a sense of community” (Rydin, 2012).

The 4th recommendation of the Lancet Commission on public health was the need to conduct a complexity analysis in order to identify unintended consequences of urban health policies (Rydin, 2012).

Evidence and theories from environmental criminology are a means of analysing the complexity of crime – and this knowledge can help avoid unintended consequences.

The Future?

- We need to collect better crime statistics for problems and analysis required in the 21st Century (e.g. ambient populations – and more accurate crime rates per users).

- Need to balance crime prevention with public health and sustainability agendas / objectives.

- Crime risk assessment – who should do it?
  - Police under-resourced
  - Should it be part of other assessment frameworks (e.g. HIA, SIA or EIA?)

- Places change, criminals adapt and CPTED practitioners must also evolve.

Thank You

Paul Cozens
Senior Lecturer
Department of Planning and Geography
Curtin University, Perth, WA
Building 201:609
Phone: 9266-7174
Email: p.cozens@curtin.edu.au

Designing Out Crime Research Centre: www.designoutcrime.org